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Abstract
A number of agri-environmental conservation policies are 
faced with the problem of imperfect monitoring. This provides 
farmers an incentive for noncompliance, in which they 
receive subsidies without implementing the conservation 
scheme. In this article, bidding behaviors and auction 
performances are compared for discriminatory-price (DP) 
and uniform-price (UP) auction in an imperfect monitoring 
environment. Our laboratory experiments show that although 
DP has certain advantages in terms of reducing policy costs, 
UP results in a superior overall performance when 
compliance behavior is taken into account.
Theoretical Predictions
Since e approaches zero in the equilibrium, (A’E’HD＋EFIH) 




 Subjects were undergraduate students in the faculty of 
economics from Shiga University in Japan. 
 In each session, the subjects were organized into group of 
sixteen, and six sessions were conducted (three sessions for 
each of the two auction formats); therefore, totally, there were
96 subjects.
 The rule of the auction was similar to the theoretical settings.
Each session consisted of 25 rounds, typically lasted 90 
minutes, and the average earnings were about US$25.
 α = 15%, f = －$3000, hence Z = $529. Costs c were spread 
uniformly between $233 and $1167 with an average of $700.
Why are the bid cap and budget lower in the DP?
Above the cost range up to $400 or $500 in the DP, bids are 
stretched horizontally around $400 or $450 (see the figure on the 
left). This bidding pattern is in line with the theory. In contrast, some 
deviation from the theory can be observed in the rate of winning. 
In theory, low-cost bidders in the DP predict the bid cap precisely, 
and they all win the auction by getting their bids as close as 
possible to the bid cap. In reality, however, a closer look at bid 
patterns shows that some low-cost bidders overestimate the bid 
cap, faultily submit bids that exceed the bid cap, and lose the 
auction. As a result, 10% or more low-cost bidders miss a chance 
to be awarded a contract. 
On the other hand, low-cost bidders in the UP rarely overbid, 
since their dominant strategy is to bid their own cost. Thus, the rate 
of winning in the UP is almost 100%, just as the theory predicts.
　To summarize, prediction error caused lower rate of winning in 
the DP.
Robustness is checked by Monte Carlo simulations. To do so, the 
bid functions and compliance function are estimated.
The bid functions are given as, b = f (cost, the lagged bid cap, sex 
and grades at university). They are estimated separately for low- 
cost/high-cost bidders, rational/irrational bidders, and UP/DP. 
The compliance function is given as, compliance dummy (0 or 1) = 
f (price-cost, auction format dummy, sex and grades at university).
Using these functions, we ran Monte Carlo simulations and found 
that even after controlling for the bidders' characteristics, UP 
outperforms DP.
Conclusion
 Simple theoretical analysis shows that the number of compliant 
winners, total fiscal budget, and efficiency are all equalized 
between the UP and DP in the long-run equilibrium where 
bidders can predict the bid cap.
 On the contrary, laboratory auctions and simulations show that 
the DP has an advantage in reducing the fiscal budgets. 
However, the UP leads to more compliant winners, thereby 
higher efficiency (defined as the ratio of the number of compliant 
winners to the budget).
 The mechanism lying behind this is the prediction error. Since 
precise prediction of the bid cap is not easy in reality, some low-
cost bidders, or potentially compliant bidders, faultily overbid
and lose the auction in the DP. In consequence, the DP is more 
likely to cause adverse selection, with more noncompliant 
bidders being awarded contracts.
 The most important implication of our study is that we should 
not evaluate auctions using just superficial performances when 
compliance behavior may matter. If we rely on the fiscal budget,
it indicates that the DP outperforms the UP. However, the 
conclusion can be quite different if compliance behavior is 
considered. Under an imperfect monitoring environment, 
compliance behavior can be crucial to determine auction 
performances.
Main assumptions:
 Long-run equilibrium where bidders can predict the bid cap.
 More than one winner maintains compliance and more than one 
winner does not. This situation can be replicated by setting 
parameters p or f appropriately. 
 Parameters p and f are constant . 
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Contrary to the theoretical predictions, experimental results show 
that all indices are smaller in the DP. 
The bid caps are lower than theoretical prediction ($529), 
implying a negative expected profit for noncompliant bidders. 
Several candidate explanations for this.
 Risk attitudes.  
 Nonstandard preferences, such as spite or joy of winning.
 Winner’s curse.
Why are there fewer compliant winners in the DP?
For high-cost bidders (c > bid cap), maintaining compliance 
leads to a negative profit. Therefore, they do not maintain 
compliance in the event of winning the auction. Only low-cost 
bidders (c < bid cap), are willing to maintain compliance. In this 
sense, low-cost bidders are candidates for being compliant 
winners.
Two reasons for fewer compliant winners…
 Less low-cost bidders in DP. This is because the bid cap is 
lower in the DP
 The rate of winning of low-cost bidders is lower in DP. 
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DP UP
(1) Bid cap 436 < 479 **
(2) Budget 3316 < 3828 **
(3) No. of compliant winners  2.7 < 3.3 *
(4) Efficiency (×10
-4) 8.0 < 8.8
(5) No. of low cost bidders 3.9 < 4.4
(6) No. of low cost winners 3.1 < 4.1 **
Winning rate = (6)/(5) 81% < 94% **
(7) No. of low cost & compliant winners 2.5 < 3.3 *
Compliance rate = (7)/(6) 80% < 82%
21-25R
DP UP
(1) Bid cap Z = Z
(2) Budget A’E’HD＋EFIH ≈ AFID
(3) No. of compliant winners  DH = DH
(4) Efficiency (3)/(2) ≈ (3)/(2)
Results
Results
DP UP DP UP
Expected bid cap 436 479 457 457
(1) Bid cap 433 < 477 457 < 457
(2) Budget 3231 < 3812 3421 < 3657
(3) No. of compliant winners  2.4 < 3.0 2.6 < 2.9
(4) Efficiency (×10
-4) 7.5 < 7.9 7.7 < 7.9
(5) No. of low cost bidders 3.8 < 4.3 4.1 < 4.1
(6) No. of low cost winners 3.0 < 3.8 3.3 < 3.6
Winning rate = (6)/(5) 78% < 88% 81% < 89%
(7) No. of low cost & compliant winners 2.4 < 3.0 2.6 < 2.9
Compliance rate = (7)/(6) 80% < 79% 80% < 80%
Case2 Case1
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Submit bid (b)
Win?
Compliant? Profit ＝ 0
Profit ＝b－c or B－c
Profit ＝ －f Profit ＝ b or B







p ％ (1－p) ％